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The United Nations, as an international moral authority, will often be re-
quested to intervene in Africa. The United Nations currently has six operations
in the African continent (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia and
Mozambique). Many African people feel that the United Nations should be in-
volved in other parts of Africa, but United National human and financial resources
are not infinite. In other words, the United Nations cannot be in every troubled
spot of Africa or be able to mobilize the required Human and Financial resources
to bring peace and security to an African continent beset by tribal, ethnic, politi-
cal, economical and social problems. The United Nations should choose and select
the operations that have a likelihood of success. How should these operations be
chosen? The United Nations may assess potential and ongoing peacekeeping oper-
ations through five necessary criteria for likelihood of success. These five criteria
are discussed in this thesis. In addition, a model for assessment of these criteria is
introduced. The six United Nations operations are assessed by this model, with a
success ranking derived for each.
This ranking may be used to select UN peacekeeping operations. The United
Nations could then redirect its efforts if necessary. The premise of this thesis is to
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations (UN) has faced many peacekeeping challenges in the African 
continent. Recently, the complexity of these challenges has increased with the end of 
the Cold War. Part of this complexity is due to the appearance of regional conflicts 
previously handled by the two super powers (United States and the former USSR). 
Currently, the UN has six ongoing peacekeeping operations in Africa. Peacekeep-
ing is defined in this thesis as the separation of fighters to keep peace, or to create 
a cease-fire that can be respected by all parties. UN peacekeeping may involve the 
institution of observer units or armed forces units. The UN charter allows the deploy-
ment of UN peacekeeping forces, but weapons may only be used in self-defense. UN 
peacekeeping missions have achieved varying degrees of success. High levels of human 
and financial resources have been expended by the international community towards 
these conflicts. 
The UN operations in six different countries are examined with relation to each 
country's political background, peacekeeping criteria, and the human and financial 
resources expended in each country. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What are the peacekeeping criteria and how are they defined? 
What human and financial resources have been expanded towa1, l peacekeeping 
in these six countries in Africa? 
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B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is it possible to assess the peacekeeping criteria with the human and financial 
resources to predict the success of peacekeeping in Africa? 
Chapter II defines the peacekeeping criteria used to evaluate the degree of likeli-
hood of success. Chapters III through VIII describe UN peacekeeping in Western Sa-
hara, Liberia, Angola, Somalia. Mozambique, and Rwanda-Uganda. The background, 
the UN involvement, the outcome of the UN intervention, and the human and financial 
costs are given for each operation. Chapter IX assesses anrl ranks UN }Jeacekeeping 
based on information obtained about each country. Chapter X evaluates peacekeeping 
in Africa based upon interviews conducted at the United Nations from April 11-14, 
1994. Chapter XI gives the conclusions of this research. 
2 
II. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
A. OLD CRITERIA 
During the Cold War, two criteria were valid for successful UN peacekeeping in 
Africa. 
• The active support of the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
• The neutrality and impartiality of the UN. 
The first UN intervention in Africa was in the Congo in the early 1960's. Although 
the United States supported this mission, it was not successful. The Congo mission 
did not have support from the Soviet Union, however. 
The first real successful operation of the UN in Africa was in Namibia. Namibia 
was a large peacekeeping effort of the UN in Africa. Namibia, originally a German 
colony, is located on the west coast of the southern part of Africa between South Africa 
and Angola. Following World War I, Namibia became the administrative responsibility 
of South Africa. Many African countries had already achieved independence. At this 
time, the Western countries of the Security Council of the UI'\ (US, France, and Britain) 
joined with Canada and Germany to form a contact group which would agree on a 
process for Namibia to achieve its independence. 
In Namibia, the government of South Africa was being fought by the resisting 
movement, Sowapo (South West African People Organization), helped by the Soviet 
Union and the African front-line countries. i.e., African neighbor countries of South 
Africa. 
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Because of the Soviet Union's connection with Sowapo and because Cuban com-
munist forces were located in Angola, later a stipulation was made by the US that 
these Cuban forces must he withdrawn from Angola for Namibian independence to be 
supported. This stipulation forced interaction between the US and the Soviet Union. 
Brian Urquhart, fromer UN Under Secretary General, summarized the Namibian 
effort in his hook, Life in Peace and War: 
One of the only results of impmved East-West relations after 1987 was the 
successful implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibian indepen-
dence, which had been settled since 1978. With the United States and the 
Soviet Union cooperating, agreement was reached on both the independence 
plan and the progressive withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola. The 
independence process, supervised by the large United Nations civilian military 
operation, which we had planned between 1978 and 1980, began on April1989 
and concluded triumphantly with the independence of Namibia in March 1990. 
[Ref. 1] 
The second criterion of UN neutrality and impartiality was met because the 
peacekeeping operations were conducted without major violations and complaints from 
any party involved. The UN plan was also agreed to by the parties prior to its imple-
mentation. 
B. NEW CRITERIA 
The main objective of the United Nations (UN) is to maintain peace and security 
around the world. To meet this objective, the UN has developed peacekeeping methods 
as an alternative to collective security. The application of sanctions against a particular 
member of the international community which is threatening peace and security in the 
world is difficult. The sanctions are applied through agreement of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. However, these members do not always agree on 
the ways and means to apply sanctions. Thus, the concept of collective security does 
not always match with a real and concrete application. The peacekeeping methods 
4 
are designed to separate fighters to keep peace or to create a cease-fire that ca.n be 
respected by all parties. UN forces may be characterized as observer units or as armed 
forces units. Military force may be employed for UN peacekeeping, but weapons may 
only be used in self-defense. The ambition of performing these jobs and the necessity 
of being able to defend themselves if attacked, brings about the legitimate question: 
What are the criteria for successful UN peacekeeping operations? 
According to William J. Durch [Ref. 2], four major criteria are necessary for 
successful peacekeeping operations. These criteria are: 
1. The "local consent" of the disputing parties: the existence of a formal agreement 
through the sponsorship of an impartial organization, e.g., UN, ECOWAS1 , and 
ECOMOG2 • (Function Fl) 
2. The neutrality and impartiality of the organization which has sponsored the 
peacekeeping forces: the sponsoring organization should be neutral and impartial 
and not show support of any fighting faction. (Function F2) 
3. The capability of handling information related to the external and internal en-
vironment of the peacekeeping forces: Does the UN know the number of troops 
each faction has? Does the UN know the amount of ammunitions and equipment 
being supplied and how it is being supplied? Does the UN know what exter-
nal forces are helping each faction or that could impede the progress of the UN 
peacekeeping mandate? (Function F3) 
4. "The active support of the great world powers"(Ref. 3] (e.g., United States. 
Soviet Union). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this criteria will either 
1 ECOWAS- Economic Community of Western African States composed of fifteen member states. 
2ECOWAS Monitoring Group - forces that ECOWAS sent to Liberia to keep peace prior to the 
UN involvement. 
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be linked to the five permanent members of the Security Council or to the only 
superpower left, the United States. "Active support [Ref. 4]" is defined as 
support from the superpower separate from its UN involvement. (Function F4) 
A fifth condition seems to be necessary for peacekeeping: the goal clarity (UN objectives 
in a particular country) of the peacekeeping operation. Are the goals clear and stable? 
Are the UN objectives understood? Do the UN goals shift with time? (Function F5) 
These five requirements should be assessed prior to and during UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
Africa is a continent in which some bou:.uaries of states are artificial. The po-
sition of clan or tribe connections is very sensitive. Before a commitment of the UN 
for peacekeeping may be made, the UN should ensure that local consent occurs across 
tribal and clan lines. Once this agreement is reached, the UN is responsible for main-
taining a strict neutrality and impartiality across the fragile acceptance of the parties 
involved. Any form of favoritism can break the fragile acceptance of peacekeeping op-
erations. This fragility is further aggravated by the fact that followers, loyal to their 
clan and/or tribe and/or faction, do not analyze or try to understand the situation 
beyond their daily need of survival. The concept of democracy (ruling of the major-
ity) does not always apply when taking into consideration the interest of the minority 
parties. Because of the multitude of the actors and the power at stake, the UN should 
place effective monitoring methods ' , :·,rrPctly assess the environment in each case. 
Understandably, information drawn or procc.'l~ed for the profit of a group (clan and/or 
tribe and/or faction) might lead to misinformation and misjudgements by UN peace-
keepers. As mentioned above, any misinformation or misjudgement could break the 
fragile equilibrium of trust created by the local consent of the involved parties. 
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Another necessary condition is to win "the active support of the great power(s)." 
[Ref. 5] This condition could generally refer to the five permanent members of the 
Security Council. However, reaching a general agreement within this group is difficult. 
So it would be more realistic to acquire bilateral support. 
Finally, the fifth necessary condition is the setting and understanding of clear 
goals. Once the initial conditions are met, the UN should be aware that a successful 
peacekeeping operation may occur only with clear goals. If conditions result in nego-
tiations, the goal may shift, causing a renev¥al of the whole process. These conditions 
arise due to the specific makeup of African countries and states. The goals likely to be 
set in Africa range from the separation of fighting factions to monitoring a cease-fire, 
to providing humanitarian aid or to monitoring of elections. 
An additional factor to consider is that of naticn building. The departure of 
Europeans left Africa divided into small countries and artificial boundaries which cut 
across ethnic backgrounds, clans and tribes. Although many African countries achieved 
independence in the 1960's, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity decided 
not to modify the boundaries inherited from the colonization era ("intangibility of the 
boundaries" [Ref. 6]). So although Africans may agree to a specific makeup of the 
countries and state boundaries, this factor excludes the possibility of building nations 
by changing the boundaries. Therefore, the most objective option left is to promote 
democracy. Democracy could give the African people a chance to elect leaders with 
prerequisites of the existance and maintenance of peace. UN peacekeeping could assist 
in providing this peace by separating the fighters, monitoring the cease-fire conditions 
and by giving humanitarian aid. 
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C. THE RATING OF THE SCALE 
The UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa might be assessed by measurement of 
the criteria of successfulness. This measurement may be set by rating the criteria met 
for each country on a scale from low to high. The following scale is used to evaluate 
the five peacekeeping criteria. 
1. Factor Fl: The "local consent" of the disputing parties: the existence of a for-
mal agreement through the sponsorship of an impartial organization, e.g., UN, 
2. Factor F2: The neutrality and impartiality of the organization which has spon-
sored the peacekeeping forces: the sponsoring organization should be neutral and 
impartial and not show support of any fighting faction. 
3. Factor F3: The capability of handling information related to the external and 
internal environment of the peacekeeping forces: Does the UN know the number 
of troops each faction has? Does the UN know the amount of ammunitions and 
equipment being supplied and how it is being supplied? Does the UN know what 
external forces are helping each faction or that could impede the progress of the 
UN peacekeeping mandate? 
4. Factor F4: "The active support of the great world powers"[Ref. 3) (e.g., United 
States, Soviet Union). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this criteria 
will either be linked to the five permanent members of the Security Council or to 
the only superpower left, the United States. "Active support [Ref. 4)" is defined 
as support from the superpower separate from its UN involvement. 
3 ECOWAS - Economic Community of Western African States composed of fifteen member states. 
4 ECOWAS Monitoring Group- forces that ECOWAS sent to Liberia to keep peace prior to the 
UN involvement. 
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5. Factor F5: The setting and understanding of clear goals. 
An assumption is made that these criteria are necessary for a likelihood of success and 
have the same importance with respect to peacekeeping. This assumption is made to 
allow the analysis to be as accurate as possible. 
• High: All requirements are met. For instance, a written agreement exists be-
tween the involved parties, or an organization regularly assesses the agreement 
and promotes complementary or additional agreement, or an organization en-
forces the implementation of the agreement. 
• Medium: conditions are acceptable but not all criteria are met. For example, a 
signed agreement may exist but may not have been honored by all the factions, 
or the timetable for disarmament may not have been respected, or there is not a 
regional organization assessing the implementation of the agreement or promoting 
an additional or complementary agreement. 
• Low: Minimum requirements are not met. For instance, there may be an incom-
plete formal agreement, or no faction is respecting the agreement. 
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III. WESTERN SAHARA 
A. BACKGROUND 
The area of Western Sahara is between Morocco and Mauritania on the northern 
coast of Africa. Most "Sahrawis1" belong to one of the twenty-two nomadic tribes 
that exist in Western Sahara. Spain established a colony there from 1884 to 1976. 
In August 1974, Madrid organized a referendum of self-determination with regards to 
establishing a "Spanish Sahara." The King of Morocco was opposed to this idea only 
if the referendum was not successful in returning the Western Sahara to the Kingdom 
of Morocco. [Ref. 7] 
After secret negotiations in November 1974, Morocco, Mauritania and Spain 
agreed to divide the Western Sahara between themselves. In this decision, the phos-
phate holdings in central Western Sahara were allocated to Spain. Morocco and Mau-
ritania sent troops, invading Western Sahara by the north and south, respectively. 
Following the withdrawal of Spain in 1976, the two armed forces were in total charge 
of Western Sahara. 
Resisting movements of Sahrawis formed, called Fente Popular para la Libera.cion 
de Saguia el-Hamra de Orio de Oro (Fente Polisario), and were supported by Cuba, 
Algeria and Libya. The Sahrawis declared independence of Western Sahara and named 
it the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). 
The Polisario decided to adopt guerrilla tactics following several years of warfare 
with Morocco and Mauritania. 
1 Persons identifying themselves as people of Western Sahara; they live either inside or outside 
Western Sahara. 
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After a series of fact-finding missions by the UN and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) the Security council approved a joint UN and OAU plan called "the settle-
ment proposals"[Ref. 8] for the supervision of cease-fire and referendum on September 
20, 1988. 
B. UN INVOLVEMENT 
In 1985, the Secretary General of the UN and the Chairman of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed a 
joint program to find a solution to the problems of Western Sahara. 
After separate missions between the UN envoy and the different parties of the 
conflict, and between the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and government 
of OAU, a document called "the settlement proposals" was written. It specified the 
ways and means for a just and definite solution "of the question of Western Sahara." 
[Ref. 9] Essentially, the means would be a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum. 
The people of Western Sahara would choose either independence or integration with 
Morocco by the right of self-determination. 
The UN/OAU joint plan includes a transitional period during which the SRSG 
"has sole and exclusive reponsibility" [Ref. 10] with respect to the referendum. The 
UN SRSG will be helped by a deputy special representative and an integrated group 
of UN civilian and military, and Western Sahara civilian police personnel. This entity 
is called the United Nations Mission for referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). 
The transitional period begins at the date of proclamation of the cease-fire and 
will finish when the results of the referendum are declared. As soon as the cease-fire is 
declared, MINURSO has to: 
• Ensure that the reduction of Moroccan forces in Western Sahara is complete. 
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• Verify that Moroccan and Fente Polisario troops are stationed in only designated 
areas, and 
• To process the release of the prisoners and detainees and supervise the exchange 
of prisoners of war. 
On 29 April 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 690(1991), deciding to set 
up the !vHNURSO mission in Western Sahara. The cease-fire was accepted by the 
Moroccans and the Sahrawis on 24 May 1991, the starting point of the transitional 
period. 
MINURSO has a standard UN organization consisting of a SRSG and his office, 
military and civilian components. The military component is expected to be com-
posed of 1,700 personnel with a security unit of about 300 police officers. The civilian 
component will range in size from about 800 to 1 ,000 personnel. 
MINURSO began with a restricted deployment with an initial setup of ten team-
sites/observation posts in the Southern and Northern parts of the Western Sahara. 
MINURSO also uses helicopters to monitor the cease-fire and to allow for quick reac-
tions to complaints of violations by either side. 
C. THE OUTCOME 
The referendum was expected to occur in January 1992 as set up by the UN 
resolution. The referendum is now more than two years late. This tardiness is due to 
disagreements on both sides over parts of the plan settlement. The problem lies in the 
definition and liability of the referendum voters. However, the two parties have not 
continued to read and evaluate the criteria of the referendum in the same way. While 
Fente Polisario accepts the census performed in 197 4 by the special administration 
as the exclusive basis of the electorate, Morocco accepts the criteria of December 
1991. Actually the efforts of MINURSO was sidetracked by the UN involvement in the 
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Gulf War. Also at least two of the necessary conditions for a successful peacekeeping 
operations were not met. Even though Morocco and Fente Polisario accepted the 
planned settlement, they did not read and evaluate the criteria of vote eligibility for 
the referendum accurately. Therefore, this is a lack of consent. Second, two of the 
five members of the Security Council having veto rights view Morocco as a government 
ally. When balancing this reliable ally against the Fente Polisario, the easy choice is to 
pick Morocco. Without this support of the Security Council, MINURSO was unable to 
prevent one party from becoming an obstacle to the plan settlement. This represents 
a lack of "support of the great powers." 
Therefore, the UN is meeting with 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs. However, 
this meeting has been postponed due to misrepresentation of some tribal chiefs. This 
blockage now allows four options: 
• To continue and intensify the talks between UN and the different parties. 
• The immediate implementation of the settlement plan to the extent that some 
aspects of the participation in the referendum will be revised. 
• To adopt a new alternative effort without consideration of the settlement plan. 
• To terminate the UN mission in Western Sahara. 
D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COST 
The UN annual budget for this operation is $3i million with 340 UN personnel. 
(Ref. 11] The three-year delay in the schedule activities has strained the planning of 




Although Liberia was initially occupied by indigenous people, it was settled by 
free Black American descendents who went there to settle and rule Liberia in July 
1847. This Black American government held until 1980 when a native Armed Forces 
sergeant, Samuel Doe, overthrew their ruling class. Doe held the government for about 
ten years until he was killed by rebel forces in September 1990. 
The current problem in Liberia has arisen from conflict between the settlers and 
the indigenous communities and from tribal rivalries within the Liberian people. This 
civil war began in early 1990 when Doe's government was strongly fought by rebels 
led by Charles Taylor. Following the death of President Doe, Liberia's political and 
government structures were chaotic with little law and order until August 1990 when 
the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) created the Economic 
Community of Western African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to settle peace 
in Liberia. 
Between 100,000 and 150,000 people have dies and 700,000 people displaced to 
neighboring countries as a result of the civil war. Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, 
now has an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by President Amos 
· Sawyer. The remainder of Liberia is divided between three main groups, the group 
led by Charles Taylor (Chief of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia), the United 
Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), and the Liberian Peace 
Council composed of members of the ex-Armed Froces of Liberia (AFL), which was 
decomposed aftet the death of President Doe. [Ref. 12] 
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B. UN INVOLVEMENT 
The UN Security Council first discussed the Liberian situation in January 1991. 
The UN encouraged the efforts of the head of states of ECO\VAS. The ECOWAS 
promoted deliberations with the warring factions and reached an agreement to settle 
peace in Liberia and the Ivory Coast in May 1992. The Security Council of the UN 
believes this agreement '·to be the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict in Liberia." [Ref. 13) 
Fighting in Liberia continued despite the Ivory Coast agreement, prompting an 
UN resolution 788(1992) in November 1992. This resolution, the starting point of the 
UN involvement in Liberia, asked for the respect and implementation of the cease-
fire and accords as conducted under the auspice of ECOWAS. With the backing of 
Chapter VII of the UN General Charter, a complete embargo on weapons and military 
equipment was imposed upon Liberia. The Secretary General also appointed a UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. James 0. C. Jonan, to 
Liberia. 
Following his appointment, the SRSG held discussions with the executive secre-
tary and member states of the ECOWAS. A consensus derived from these discussions 
gave the UN a larger role in the search of peace in Liberia with a commitment for a 
"systematic cooperation between the UN and a regional organization, as envisaged in 
Chapter VII of the Charter." (Ref. 14] 
On 25 July 1993, a meeting was held m Cotonou (Benin) to establish a new 
agreement. Participants at that meeting included Dr. Jonan (Co-Chairman), Pres-
ident Canaan Banana of the Organization of African Unity (Co-Chairman), Abass 
Bundu (Executive Secretary of ECOWAS), and the leaders of the fighting factions. 
The Cotonou Agreement was formulated with a clear framework drawn for a cease-fire 
and national elections through two major steps: disarmament and demobilization. 
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The date for the cease-fire was set for 1 August 1993. To prevent violation of 
the cease-fire agreement, the "parties agreed to establish a joint cease-fire monitoring 
committee, comprised of representatives of the three Liberian factions, ECOMOG, and 
the UN." [Ref. 15] This committee was composed of 30 advance military observers from 
many different countries. On September 22, 1993, the UN Security Council created the 
observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by Resolution 866(1993) to expand the efforts 
of the advanced observor group. 
1. UNOMIL 
As a standard UN operation, UNO MIL obeyed the chain of command of the 
UN through the SRGS. The UNO MIL is composed of military and civilian components, 
as follows: 303 military observers, 20 medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 58 UN 
volunteers, 89 international personnel and 136 local staff. The UNOMIL headquarters 
is located in Monrovia with four additional locations in Eastern Libera, Northern 
Liberia, Western Liberia, and greater Monrovia. 
The military aspect of UNOMIL is essentially related to the monitoring 
and verifying of the compliance with the cease-fire and the embargo on delivery of 
arms and military equipment. UNOMIL is also required to monitor and verify the 
encampment, disarmament and demobilization. An additional job of UNOMIL is to 
report any violation of the agreement including the as!)ects of International Human 
Law, training of outside personnel, and the evaluation of financial requirements for the 
demobilization of the different clans. 
The civilian component has two main jobs: to provide humanitarian and 
development assistance and electoral assistance. The humanitarian and development 
section works with the UN Special Coordinator's office in assisting relief activities and 
helping refugees (resettlement, reintegration) through the SH.SG. The civilian compo-
nent will also supervice the entire electoral process from registration to the vote itself 
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and will monitor final results. The civilian component is comprised of 13 professionals, 
40 UN volunteers and necessary support staff. The organization of the election is the 
responsibility of the Liberian National Transitional Government, acting through the 
Liberian Elections Commission. The three fighting factions involved in the conflict 
(IGNU, NPLF, ULIMO) are represented on the Liberian Elections Commission. 
2. ECOMOG 
a. Background 
After many months of Civil War, the 15 countries of the Economic 
Community of Western African States1 (ECOWAS) signed an agreement of mutual 
assistance for defense in Freetown (capital of Sierra Leone) in 1990. Through this 
agreement, a mediation committee was appointed in Banjul (capital of Gambia), which 
created the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group known as ECOMOG. The general 
mandate of ECOMOG was to settle law and order by enforcing the cease-fire negotiated 
between fighting parties and to keep peace in Liberia. This broad mandate was derived 
from an "ECOWAS Peace Plan" [Ref. 16) which specified the following actions: 
• The agreement of a cease-fire between the fighting factions, 
• To monitor the cease-fire, 
• The settlement of a widely represented interim government in which all Liberian 
factions would take part, 
• To hold general and Presidential elections within 12 months, and 
• To monitor the elections. 
1ECOWAS is composed of the following countries: Benin, Burkina-faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'lvoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bisseau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-
Leone, and Togo. 
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ECOMOG troops were sent to Liberia in August 1990 and succeeded 
in stopping mass killings in l\lonrovia (capital of Liberia). The implementation of the 
ECOWAS Peace Plan also requested negotiation of an additional peace agreement in 
Yamoussokro (capital of Cote d'lvoire) on October 30, 1991 to establish the enforce-
ment steps of the Peace Plan. This agreement, "Yamoussokro IV Accord," [Ref. 17) 
became the general framework for the solution to the crisis. The Yamoussokro IV 
Accord directs the encampment and disarmament of all the fighting factions through 
ECOMOG and establishes transitional institutions for free and fair elections. 
b. ECOMOG in Action in Liberia 
From August to November 1990, 3,000 ECOMOG troops worked to 
keep fighting factions out of Monrovia or in encampments with t~P f,)llowing results: 
• The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), cor.1 ""(l<ied of former soldiers, were encamped 
in their barracks, 
• The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was thrown out of Monrovia, 
• The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), headed by Prince 
Johnson, was confined in a small part of Monrovia (Caldwell area), 
• The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia was derived from the 
breakdown of the ArmE;J Forces of Liberia. Former members of the AFL flew to 
Sierra Leone and formed ULIMO in 1990, 
• ECOMOG helped install the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). 
During this time, the ECOl\IOG troops grew from 3,000 to 17,500, with the largest 
number of forces coming from only one country (75%). Other countries sending forces 
included Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Senegal.2 For two years until 
2Senegal withdrew her forces in January 1993. 
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October 1992 ECOMOG established law and order in Monrovia. The Yamoussokro IV 
Accord was supposed to allow disarmament and encampment of all fighting factions. 
However, the remainder of the Liberian territory had mainly become controlled by 
Charles Taylor's forces. 
In April 1992, Charles Taylor signed an accord in Geneva allowing 
ECOMOG to secure the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, ECOMOG 
troops were deployed in a buffer zone. Two months later, a gun battle occurred in 
which Senegalese (part of ECOMOG forces) were captured and executed by NPFL 
forces. Th~ ECOMOG deployment was then cancelled. All African ECOMOG forces 
were to be brought back to Monrovia, but were held back by the NPFL until the 
intervention of The Former US President, Jimmy Carter. This incident became a 
turning point in the ECOMOG involvement in Liberia. The ECOWAS forces began to 
act like peace enforcers and were directly attacked by combattants. The NPFL forces 
held the ECOMOG forces for a month. In response to this hostility, ECOMOG began 
air strikes against Charles Taylor's forces who could not retaliate. 
The incidents between ECOMOG and NPFL caused the reformation of 
the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia). The AFL was the former Armed Forces during the 
era of President Samuel Doe. After Doe's death, the AFL was disarmed and encamped. 
c. The Outcome 
ECOMOG has brou~ 1t peace and order to Monrovia and has stopped 
the ethnic mass killings. However, the spirit and the letter of Yamoussokro IV Ac-
cord have not been completely successful because the warring factions are not entirely 
disarmed and encamped. 
ECOMOG forces began to deploy throughout the country on March 1, 
1994 to supervise the disarmament of the factions. Over 60,000 soldiers of the two 
main factions, ULIMO and NPLF, must be disarmed. Disarmament operations are 
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scheduled to begin March 14, 1994. However, prior to the deployment of ECOMOG 
forces, Charles Taylor, leader of NPLF - the most powerful faction, stated that he 
would never turn over any arms to soldiers from ECOMOG. This statement is are-
newed signal of distrust of Charles Taylor toward the leading country (which provided 
75% of ECOMOG forces). Charles Taylor therefore requested that forces from Uganda 
and Tanzania be brought in. These forces were not part of ECOMOG and Taylor felt 
they would be more impartial and would also dilute the the leading country dominance. 
Thus, 1700 soldiers were sent to Liberia to satisfy this request. The ECOMOG field 
commander acceded to these requests. The ECOMOG forces have been deployed as 
follows: the Ugandi and Tanzanian soldiers have been deployed to the territory con-
trolled by Charles Taylor; the Ghanaan soldiers are in Western Liberia where ULIMO 
is dominant, and the Nigerian soliders are in southeast Liberia. ECOMOG peacekeep-
ers are paid between $5 and $10 per day ($150-300 per month) per soldier with a total 
peacekeeping budget of $500 million per year. [Ref. 18] 
3. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS 
The UN peacekeeping operation has been set up since September 1993. Fun-
damentally, the UN has met at least one necessary condition of peacekeeping: the 
consent of all parties to peace through the Cotonou Peace agreement. The UNOMIL 
operation was evaluated to cost $40 million for a seven month period. [Ref. 19] Thus 
far, UNOMIL seems to have a high probability for success. 
The UN operation in Liberia has the support of one great power: the United 
States, meeting another condition set for success in peacekeeping efforts. The US forces 
have assisted the agreement efforts by providing airlifts of African forces to Liberia. 
The UN is spending $40 million for this operation in Liberia. 
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C. ASSESSMENT OF ECOMOG 
1. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COST 
ECOMOG intervention in Liberia seems to be a model for regional conflict 
resolution. In fact, it seems to be a cost effective solution. ECOMOG peacekeepers 
are paid between $5 and $10 per day ($150-300 per month) per soldier with a total 
peacekeeping budget of $500 million per year. Conversely, UN peacekeepers cost $1000 
per soldier per month. [Ref. 20] 
2. PROBLEMS OF ECOMOG 
The large percentage of forces present from one country is a great concern. 
One country provides most of the soldiers and equipment for Liberia peacekeeping. 
This country is thus perceived to dominate the region. 
Nevertheless, the general hope is that her forces become balanced within 
ECOMOG. This balance must be monitored by ECOWAS. Also, the Organization 
of African Unity should ensure that a single country agenda is not being applied in 
Liberia. 
3. GREAT POWER SUPPORT 
The US has always publically recognized its support of the ECOWAS peace 
plan. The US reaffirmed its support in a hearing before the US Senate Foreign Relations 
subcommittee on African Affairs on June 9, 1993. The Assistant Secretary of State 
said, "We seek a negotiated settlement with the assistance of the UN and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of full disarmament of all Liberian 
warring factions." [Ref. 21] 
4. RELATIONS BETWEEN UN AND ECOMOG 
UNOMIL and ECOMOG are working together in Liberia, each with a specific 
job to accomplish. The main responsibility of ECOMOG is to enforce the Cotonou 
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Agreement signed by the fighting parties and witnessed by the UN representative and 
the OAU special envoy, under the auspices of ECOWAS. UNOMIL is responsible for 
humanitarian actions in Liberia and is also responsible for monitoring neutral and 
impartial implementation of the Cotonou agreement. Although these two entities do 
not have the same chain of command, they cooperate within the following formal 
framework. (See Figure 4.1) [Ref. 22) 
Liberia is divided into four regions for UNOMIL and four sections for ECOMOG. 
The regions and the sectors run across the same geographical areas. A UNOMIL and 
ECOMOG headquarters is located within each region or section. The airports and ports 
are under dual control of both UNOMIL and ECOMOG. The airports, port units, 
observer, liaison, sea headquarters are provided with UNOMIL investigative teams. 
The containment teams are under the control of the UN. This theoretical framework 
works according to a reporting relationship from the level of the UN Secretary-General 
and the ECOWAS Chairman down to the smallest element of ECOMOG and UNO MIL. 
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23 
ECOWAS early initiativ~ m Liberia prior to UN intervention brought significant 
progress to Liberian peacekeeping, particularly by stopping the mass killing. Although 
ECOWAS is not a military organization, its fifteen members had many valid reasons 
for intervening prior to obtaining help from the international community. 
The decomposition of Liberia had to be held to definite limits to avoid increased 
problems in that region. The ECOWAS initiative was applauded in Africa, because 
the regional organization had better understanding of the African culture and the un-
derlying concepts and aspects of tribal conflicts. However, the ECOWAS intervention 
did have some shortcomings: 
• The important issue is that the national sovereignty is disappearing because 
of the collapse of the economy and the mass killings. The government then 
becomes willing to do whatever ECOWAS asks it to do to get security which 
bewmes an absolute value. The ECOWAS policy is applied by ECOMOG, but 
within ECOMOG, one country has an hegemonic position. The fear is that the 
country's own national interest is derived from this hegemonic position. This 
concern raises the issue of balance of power within ECOMOG forces. 
• The imbalance in ECOMOG forces, reflected by an hegemony of one country, 
might be the main factor preventing the full confidence of Charles Taylor, the 
leader of the strongest faction in Liberia, toward ECOMOG. This hegemony is 
indirectly challenged by some Liberian neighboring countries which are suspected 
to be helping Charles Taylor on an undercover basis, although these countries are 
members of ECOWAS. In an attempt to balance the forces in ECOMOG, troops 
of non-ECOWAS countries have been sent to Liberia (Uganda and Tanzania). 
This is a classic move to shift the balance of power, but no other country can 
balance the hegemonic country which is far more powerful than many African 
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countries together. The result is that guerrilla warfare could continue to be 
ongoing in this region, although the incidences are far less important than the 
mass killing at the beginning of the conflict. The risk is that the credibility 
of ECOWAS might be damaged. The balance to this hegemonic power should 
be created through the UN and US. The UN can effectively balance the forces 
in Liberia by sending more troops and in the meantime, ECOMOG may be 
monitored. The US gives financial help to ECOMOG through ECOWAS with 
conditions requiring specific behaviors from the leading country with respect to 
its role. 
Countries have the dilemma of benefiting from security without economic cost 
(the leading country bears the important share of the burden) and the appeal of 
directing their efforts towards democracy by Western Countries which tie their 
help to the principles of democracy for African countries. 
• The final point is that as one observes the diagram of reporting relationships, it 
is noticeable that an ECOWAS political authority is not physically represented 
in Liberia. The Field Commander could be obliged to make political decisions 
for which he is not mandated or he can choose not to make a decision until 
he consults the Chairman of ECOWAS. Therefore, ECOWAS should appoint a 





Angola, a former colony of Portugal, became an independent state in 1975. An-
gola has been ruled by a communist party since its independence but has been fought 
by anti-government rebels. The communist party was aided in these efforts by Cuban 
forces. In an effort to stop civil war, the United States, Soviet Union and South Africa 
met in 1988 for negotiations. An agreement was made to discontinue aid to the rebel 
forces and for Cuba to withdraw from Angola. Angola and Cuba then asked the UN 
to settle a UN mission to assist in the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This 
mission was named the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEMII). All 
Cuban forces were withdrawn from Angola by May 25, 1991. [Ref. 23) 
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the weakened communist gov-
ernment of Angola held talks with the rebels. The two grollps eventually signed the 
Peace Accords for Angola ("Acordos de Paz" (Ref. 24]) in May 1991. According to the 
Peace Accords, government and rebel troops must be gathered in 46 "assembly areas" 
for UN observers to check the numbers of troops, the number of weapons, irregular 
troops (on both sides - government and rebels), demolized troops and the soldiers 
expected to become JJart of the new Angolan Armed forces. 
The Peace Accords for Angola also scheduled "free and fair elections under the 
supervision of international observers." [Ref. 25] The UN Security Council there~ore 
decided to expand UNAVEM's mandate to supervise the Angolan elections (Presiden-
tial and legislative). Although the National Electoral Council (NEC) was responsible 
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for the organization of the elections, in which all legal parties were represented, UN ob-
servers gave logistic help during the elections (including airlifts to reach remote areas). 
The elections were finally held on September 22 and 30, 1992. 
B. UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT 
Once the withdrawal of the Cuban forces was completed, the UN started the 
mission to implement the Peace Accords between the Angolan government and the 
rebels. The implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola required UN AVEMII to 
adopt the following mandates from the UN Security Council: 
• To monitor the cease-fire, and 
• To verify the neutrality of the Angolan police. 
C. OUTCOME 
Despite the general assessment by UN officials that the "elections were free and 
fair," [Ref. 26] the leader of the former rebel faction rejected the results and immedi-
ately engaged in violence against the government. After a new cease-fire and diplomatic 
efforts, the leader of the rebel movement accepted only the results of the legislative 
elections which gave the victory to the communist government party. He would not 
accept the outcome of the presidential election. 
The UN intervention in Angola has had limited results due to the problems during 
the cease-fire, the pre-election period and the presidential and legislative elections. The 
demobilization and the monitoring of the disarmament of the troops, as well as the 
inventory and monitoring of the weapons were also at fault. In reality, after many 
years of civil war, 16 months became too short a time period to build trust between 
the government and the rebel forces. 
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D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS 
The UN Security Council has authorized 350 military personnel, 216 police ob-
servers, 87 international and 155 local civilian staff to be part of UN AVEM, but only 
70 observers are deployed. The two UN missions in Angola (UNAVEM I and II) have 




From its independence on July 1, 1960, Somalia was proud of its democracy 
and the relationships created among the pastoral group, the clans, and the elites. 
The elite groups were generally educated in Italy during the Italian occupation. The 
Somalian constitution was democratic until 1969 when General Siad Barre overtook 
the government after a coup d'etat. [Ref. 27] 
Siad Barre, however, had his own agenda during the Cold War, in which the main 
actors were the United States and the former Soviet Union. Siad Barre even switched 
his alliance from the Soviet Union to the United States in the 1980's. Conseqnently, 
he lost his credibility both inside and outside his country. Also, with the end of the 
Cold War, Somalia no longer occupied an important geostrategic position. 
The loss of credibility of the head of state caused Somalia to also lose its credi-
bility. Therefore, Somalia lost financial aid from other countries. 
Regional uprisings started to occur in the 1980's and continued throughout the 
early 1990's. After losing control, General Barre left the country on January 27, 1991. 
Since that date, Somalia has split into many factions. The factions have become 
involved in power struggles in which 100,000 Somali's have been killed, both from the 
fighting and from hunger. The peak of the deaths was in October 1992 when 1000 
Somali's died per day, among them 500 children. Somalia as a state disappeared. 
After Siad Barre left the country, the UN started humanitarian actions but the 
lack of security and the violent fights in Mogadishu caused the UN to suspend its 
actions until the UN received cooperation from the International Committee of the 
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Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations. The fights were between two 
rival clans: one of the Interim President Ali Mahdi and the other of the Chairman of 
the United Somali Congress, General Monamed Farah Aidid. 
The situation in Somalia gradually became worse to the concern of the U~ Sec-
retary General, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Islamic Conference. 
Consultations were held in the UN headquarters from February 12-14, 1992. Partici-
pants were the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of Islamic Community 
(OIC), the Interim President Ali Mahdi, and General Aidid. The outcome of these 
consultations resulted in an "Agreement of the Implementation of a Cease-fire" [Ref. 
28] between th:: two main factions fighting in Mogadishu. The agreement also specified 
the authorization for the UN to deploy teams of military ol-·,.Prvers (20 people each) to 
monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. 
B. UN INVOLVEMENT 
After the Security Council adopted the cease-fire implementation on March 17, 
1992, resolution 746 was adopted, authorizing the deployment of a technical team to 
monitor the cease-fire in Mc.gadishu. In April1992, a resolution 751(1992) created the 
United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Security Council also asked 
for continuation of negotiations between all the parties of Somalia to work toward 
the organization of a conference of national reconciliation and unity. The Security 
Council also asked for financial help from the international community to implement 
the "Secretary-General's 90 day plan of action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance 
to Somalia." [Ref. 29] The SRSG was ~ppointed April 28, 1992. 
The involvement of the UN in Somalia has been very complicated. Initially, fifty 
unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers were sent to monitor the cease-
fire. At this time, the UN agreed to provide security personnel to monitor the safety 
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and security of seaports and airports to protect supplies, deliveries and humanitarian 
relief centers. On August 12, 1992, the Somalian main factions agreed that the UN 
should send 500 United Nations security personnel. 
Despite the agreement, the cease-fire in Mogadishu was not effective. On July 
27, the Security Council decided to send another technical team to Somalia, marking 
the UN escalation in Somalia. Additional UN forces were sent: 
• Four additional United Nations security units of 750 each. 
• Three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel. 
By August 28, 1992, the UNOSOM operation consisted of 4,219 personnel. Despite 
all these efforts, the situation in Somalia was still not secure or safe, and in fact, the 
situation was even deteriorating. 
The peak of the deaths occurred in October 1992 with 1000 Somali's dying per 
day, half of them children. Somalia now had no central government and the only law 
was the law of the guns. Neither the UN nor the non-governmental organizations could 
do their job. 
Upon a recommendation of the Secretary General, the Security Council adopted 
resolution 794(1992) on December 3, 1992 to authorize "the use of all necessary means 
to establish as soon as possible a secure environemnt for humanitarian relief operations 
in Somalia." [Ref. 30] The Security Council asked member states to contribute toward 
this effort, whether in cash or kind. The United States thereupon sent 25,000 troops 
to Somalia to save "thousands of innocents." [Ref. 31] This effort has become known 
as the successful "Operation Restore Hope" (December 5, 1992 to May 1, 1993). 
The US led the first element of the United Task Force (UNITAF), deployed in 
Mogadishu on December 9, 1992. The UNITAF forces spread their actions, not only 
in Mogadishu, but to all distribution centers throughout the country. These UNITAF 
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forces quickly brought security to humanitarian efforts. The great success of UNITAF 
forces in Somalia caused the UN to enlarge the UNOSOM MANDATE to enforce the 
cease-fire permanently, to control heavy weapons, to disarm the lawless gangs and 
to create a new Somalian police force. The UN thought to effect a transition from 
UNITAF force operations to peacekeeping operations. This transition leads to the 
establishment of UNOSOM II. 
The Security Council resolution 794( 1992) (UNOSOM II) allowed the deployment 
of 37,000 troops to Somalia. The Somalian security environment had become safer and 
the humanitarian relief centers were able to safely feed the people. However, these 
actions were performed without a regular government. The new mandate of UNOSOM 
II included eight objectives: 
1. To monitor the cease-fire and the commitment of all Somalian factions to the 
agreement of Addis Ababa.1 [Ref. 32] 
2. To prevent any action of violence and to take action towards any source of vio-
lence. 
3. To control the heavy weapons; to destroy any heavy weapons or to transfer them 
to the new Somali Army (if formed). 
4. To collect lawfully the small arms of non-authorized armed elements; to assist in 
the registration and security of these arms. 
5. To settle and maintain security in seaports, airports and throughout the lines of 
ocmmunication necessary for humanitarian relief organizations. 
1The Somali political movements attended the National Reconciliation Conference at Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) from 4-15 January 1993. This conference was initiated by the United Nations in relation 
with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of Islamic 
Committee. At this conference, the participants agreed on implementing the cease-fire and on modal-
ities of disarmament. 
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6. To ensure protection of the equipment, installations, and personnel of the UN, 
the non-governmental organizations, and internal organizations of Somalia. 
7. To clear the land mines in the country. 
8. To assist the refugees and displaced persons toward integration in their country. 
To carry out these new mandate requirements, the deployment of a 20,000 unit military 
component, 8,000 logistic personnel, and 2,800 civilian personnel were sent to Somalia. 
The United States also agreed to send a tactical reaction force to support the force 
Commander of UNOSOM II.2 
C. THE OUTCOME 
According to its mandate, UNOSOM had the duty of disarming the factions 
which led the violent oppositions against the UN. Following an ambush that killed 25 
Pakistani's on June 5, 1993, the UN Security council authorized the Secretary-General 
by resolution 814(1993) to take "all necessary measures against those responsible for 
the armed attacks." (Ref. 33] 
The June ambush was the turning point of the UNOSOM action in Somalia. This 
ambush led to various incidents causing 81 casualties among the UN froces and to the 
decision of the US to withdraw its forces. 
UNOSOM II then undertook strong military actions enabling the removal of Ra-
dio Mogadishu from the United Somali Congress (General Aidid's organization). UN-
OSOM II also destroyed and neutralized militia weapons and equipment. It began to 
be obvious that effective disarmament of the faction was a prerequisite of the achieve-
ment of the overall mandate of UNOSOM II. Upon recommendation of the Secretary 
General, the Security Council decided to resettle the Somali Police, the judicial and 
2The SRSG of the Somalian effort is a retired Admiral of the US Navy and the commanding officer 
of UNOSOM is a Lieutenant-General from Thrkey. 
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penal systems, and to apprehend and bring to justice criminal elements, particularly 
those responsible for the ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers. 
The activities of the different clans and factions in Somalia did not prevent hu-
manitarian efforts. Many improvements were noticed in the country. Humanitarian 
relief centers were active in distributing supplies throughout the country. A safe and 
secure environment was effected due to the protection of UNOSOM. Schools closed 
for many years were again functioning. Somali people were no longer starving. Early 
death was being prevented by nutrition and immunization programs. UNOSOM II was 
also caring for the refugees and displaced and were sending them home. 
Economic activities of agriculture and commerce were starting again after a de-
cline of over four years. Actually, Somalia needed an overall reconstruction program, 
requiring first the restoration of security and stability. UNOSOM II was actively pa-
trolling to apprehend and bring to justice those responsible for the Pakistani ambush 
and for the instigation of violence against UN troops. In one action, the United States 
Rangers tried to capture General Aidid's top aides on October 3, 1993. In their fight 
against Aidid's militia men, eight US soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. 
The body of one US soldier was subjected to indecent treatment. This tragic event 
marked a decline of UN intervention in Somalia. The US decided to withdraw its forces 
by March 1994, causing other countries to also decide on withdrawal. Somali clans and 
factions are thus rearming themselves and more fighting is anticipated. 
D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS 
The Security Council authorized 28,000 military personnel from 29 countries 
and 2,800 civilian staff. An additional 17,700 US troops not under the operational 
command of UNOSOM II are also in Somalia. This figure includes the Quick Reaction 
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Force formed to support UNOSOM, but after the withdrawal of Western forces. The 
20,000 UN peacekeepers in Somali come mainly from developing countries. 




Mozambique originally a Portugese colony, achieved independence in 1975. How-
ever, a rebel movement, FRELIMO (Front of Liberation of Mozambique, the fought 
against the colonialists and eventually took over the government. This newly estab-
lished government was opposed by another movement called the Revolutionary Na-
tional Movement of Mozambique (RENAMO) for a period of 14 years. In October 
1992, the government and the rebels signed a General Peace Agreement allowing the 
UN to enforce a Peace Agreement, monitoring the implementation and to give technical 
assistance for general elections. 
The terms of the agreement stated that the cease-fire would start no later than 
October .15, 1992 which would be called E-Day. Following E-Day, the fighting fac-
tions were to be separated and concentrated in designated areas with demobilization 
of soldiers serving in the factions. Some of these soldiers would be eligible for the 
new Mozambican Defence Forces. The agreement also authorized the preparation of 
elections to be held no later than October 15, 1993. [Ref. 34) 
B. UN INVOLVEMENT 
UN representative initially participated in negotiations between the Mozambican 
government and the rebel movement, arriving at a General Peace Agreement signed 
on October 4, 1992 in Rome, Italy. 
The General Peace Agreement asked the UN for assistance in implementation 
of the Agreement through monitoring of critical tasks related to the cease-fire, the 
elections and also for humanitarian assistance. The agreement specified that the UN 
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would not allow the elections to be held until the military situation between the govern-
ment and the rebels was resolved to allow proper implementation of the General Peace 
Agreement. The enforcement of the Agreement was the responsibility of a supervisory 
and monitoring commission chaired by the United Nations. A United Nations Resolu-
tion 782(1992) appointed an interim Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) and a team of 25 observers for the Mozambique operations, now named ON-
UMOZ. 
The SRSG and the team of 25 members arrived in Mozambique onE-Day. 
"As the Civil War intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the agreement of 
the government of Mozambique, deployed troops in the transport corridors, to assist 
the government's forces in keeping them open. These corridors, which run across 
Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to landlocked countries to the North and West, 
are of critical importance for Southern Africa." [Ref. 35] 
The UN has now authorized between 7,000 and 8,000 UN troops and civilian personnel 
in Mozambique. At the current time, 30 military observers and 6,250 infantry and 
support personnel are in Mozambique. Observers were set up at Nampula and Beira 
with two teams in charge of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique. This 
withdrawal was an important request for the rebel forces to win in the General Peace 
Agreement. 
The SRSG organized a meeting in Maputo between the Government and REN-
AMO, requiring a high level of representation from both sides. The purpose of this 
meeting was to settle the constant violations of the cease-fire. The SRSG also appointed 
the supervisory and monitoring commission members with the following mandate: 
• To guarantee the implementation of the agreement, 
• To solve disputes which might occur between the parties, and 
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• To guide and coordinate the activities of subcommittees. 
The supervisory and monitoring commission was chaired by a UN representative and 
was comprised of the Mozambican government, RENAMO, Italy (the mediator state), 
France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer state at the Rome 
talks) and the Organization of African Unity. Germany also became a member of this 
entity at a later date. Three subidiary committees were set up: 
• The cease-fire commission, 
• Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel Commission, and 
• The formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces. 
1. ONUMOZ 
ONUMOZ is composed of four components: political, military, electoral, 
and humanitarian. all political matters related to the General Peace Agreement were 
referred to the SRSG. The SRSG and his office were responsible for giving directions 
towards peace in Mozambique. By doing so, enforcement of the General Peace Agree-
ment should occur. The SRSG delegates decisions to the supervisory and monitoring 
commission and the subsidiary committees. 
The monitoring of the cease-fire is also the responsibility of ONUMOZ. Once 
the cease-fire is successful, ONUMOZ should ensure that the demobilization and con-
tainment of the troops is effective and that the collection, stockage and destruction 
of weapons occurs. ONUMOZ is responsible for ensuring that all foreign forces leave 
Mozambique. ONUMOZ is tasked with monitoring the dissolution of private and non-
formal armed groups that have existed throughout the Civil War years. 
The military component also had tasks related to the humanitarian aspect 
because ONUMOZ was given the responsibility to keep the vital infrastructure intact 
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and to protect national and international relief organizations. The military component 
is divided into three military regions with subdivisions of 49 assembly areas. 
The many transitional phases of this efforts requires a close interrelationship 
between the military and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ. During this process, 
110,000 soldiers will be disarmed, concentrated and demobilized and finally, integrated 
into civil society, requiring humanitarian and professional support. Cooperation will 
also be vital during the mine clearance operations to ensure a safe environment. Addi-
tionally, observers will need to be placed at strategic areas including airports, ports, and 
other important vital points in the country. ONUMOZ must therefore work together 
with the United Nations Office for coordination of these efforts. 
The general headquarters of the humanitarian component is established in 
Maputo (capital city of Mozambique) with extensions throughout the regions and 
provinces. Duties of the humanitarian component are: 
• To return refugees in neighboring countries to their homes, 
• To give food and other relief to soldiers gathered in the assembly areas, 
• To assist the 100,000 demobilized soldiers with conversion to civilian life, 
• To identify training needs and employment opportunities, and 
• to project its actions to the future through education. 
The humanitarian needs of almost six million people must be met. Among 
these six million, 4.5 million were internally displaced persons (including 370,000 to 
be demobilized), with 1.5 million refugees in neighboring countries. The focus of the 
humanitarian program has shifted from a typical quick emergency support program to 
and important program of home settlement and a restart of life. The current estimate 
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is that 1.5 million Mozambicans have returned home through this humanitarian effort. 
This successful reinstallation of the refugees and displaced persons is a prerequisite for 
a normal electoral framework. 
The electoral division of ONUMOZ (through the SRSG) is tasked with mon-
itoring all phases of the electroal process, although the elections themselves will be 
organized by the National Elections Commission (NEC). The NEC is responsible for 
directing the general elections in relation to the government, the National Election 
Commission, and the Mozambican political parties. 
The established government of Mozambique has taken the initiative to write 
and distribute a draft electoral law to RENAMO and all involved political parties in 
March 1993. However, RENAMO and the other political parties claimed they didn't 
have enough time to study this law. Eventaully, this law became an obstacle to the 
progress of the electoral process. 
a. The False Start of ONUMOZ 
After the General Peace Agreement was signed, a timetable was agreed 
to for the cease-fire, the gathering of the fighting troops, their demobilization and 
finally, the elections. Although the cease-fire was broadly respected, many delays 
occurred because of the lack of confidence of all disputing parties towards each other 
with respect of how and when to disarm and demobilize. 
RENAMO also wanted ONUMOZ to deploy 65% of their forces before 
demobilization, however, the UN did not meet this desire because legal and logistic 
administrative problems existed. An accurate level of UN support required for the 
ONUMOZ effort has never been accurately assessed, causing further delays. These 
problems created the necessity for a new timetable to allow the full deployment of 
ONUMOZ observer teams and troops and the establishment of logistics in the three 
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operational regions of Mozambique. The new timetable was established to begin on 
June 3, 1993 with a 16 month completion period. 
C. THE OUTCOME 
Once the deployment of ONUMOZ troops occurred, decisive steps were achieved. 
These steps include the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Zimbabwe and Malawi. 
However, important phases of the Peace Agreement have still not been achieved. These 
phases include: 
• The creation of the National Election Commission, 
• The concentration and demobilization of troops, and 
• The settlement of a new Mozambican Defence Forces. 
An important step towards the establishment of the Mozambique Defence Forces is 
the UN resolution 850(1993) approving a UN chair for a Joint Commission for the 
formation of these forces. 
Direct talks between the President of Mozambique and a representative of REN-
AMO in August 1993 resulted in agreement of both parties of the new timetable. Since 
that time, progress has been noticed in the demobilization, cease-fire, formation of the 
Mozambican Defence Force, the humanitarian program and the electoral activities. 
In the General Peace Agreement, 49 assembly areas for demobilization and contain-
ment were identified with 36 of them accepted by all parties. Twenty-three ONUMOZ 
teams are deployed to these 36 areas. Therefore, containment is expected to succeed. 
In addition, five infantry battalions have been deployed to protect the corridors. 
D. FINANCIAL and PERSONNEL COSTS 
The UN is spending $290 million per year for this mission with 6,600 UN personnel 





Rwanda. was a. Belgian colony prior to independence in the 1960's. However, two 
powerful tribes exist in Rwanda., the Hutu and Tutsi. The government is in the hands of 
the Hutu tribe, causing tribal uprising between the Hutu and the Tutsi. This situation 
has led to a. circle of tribal uprising and government repression. The most serious 
incident between the armed forces of the government of Rwanda. and the Rwa.ndese 
Patriotic Front (RPF) occurred in October 1992 between the borders of Rwanda. and 
Uganda.. (Ref. 37] 
The countries of Uganda. and Rwanda. wrote separate letters to the UN security 
council asking for military observers to be deployed along the 150 kilometer common 
border of the two countries. Uganda. asked for protection of its borders from the Rwa.n-
dese fighting factions and Rwanda. asked for assistance in negotiating pea.ce between 
the Rwandese fighting factions. 
Concurrently, the Organization of African Unity and the Republic of Tanzania 
were a.lso trying to create a peace agreement between the two fighting factions. A meet-
ing was held in Dar-es-Salam from March 5-7, 1993. The fighting parties committed 
to negotiate a settlement and a cease-fire on March 9, 1993. (Ref. 38] 
B. UN INVOLVEMENT 
Upon receiving the letters from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, the 
security council asked the government and rebel parties of Rwanda for an agreement 
of the cease-fire and overall fulfillments of the Dar-es-Salam conference. The security 
council thereupon sent a technical team to Rwanda-Uganda, authorized by Resolution 
42 
if% : . t Av :; ... · ... ; t;t. . . q; ,tt,.,; a. a;c .. a 
846(1993). This resolution was named the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-
Rwanda {UNOMUR). 
A total of 81 military observers were deployed for UNOMUR by the end of 
September 1993. UNOMIR's mandate focused mainly on the collection and trans-
portation of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment from Uganda to Rwanda. 
At the same time, the Organization of African Unity was trying to deploy a neutral 
military observer group (NMOG) to Rwanda to assist in monitoring the cease-fire. 
Following this positive initiative of the OAU, the UN decided to initiate the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda and integrated the UNOMUR program into 
UNAMIR. 
The mandate of UNAMIR is "to contribute to the establishment and mainte-
nance of a climate conducive of the secure installation and subsequent operation of the 
transitional government." To achieve this mandate, UNAMIR, with assistance from 
NMOG, must: [Ref. 39] 
• Ensure that the cease-fire is respected by all parties. 
• Establish an expanded demilitarized zone {DMZ) and demobilized procedures. 
• Give special attention to the security situation throughout the transitional period. 
• Give assistance for mine clearance. 
• Monitor the violations of the peace agreement. 
• Help to reinstall the refugees and displaced persons. 
• Provide protection to the non-governmental and international organizations for 
relief supplies. 
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C. THE OUTCOME 
The Security Council decided that UNAMIR's actions should be performed step-
by-step until national elections are held in September 1995 and a new government 
installed. However, UNAMIR will only be allowed to stay in Rwanda for three months 
following the installation of the new government. 
On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda was killed in a plane crash following 
a meetmg in Arusha. Riotings and mass killings occurred in Kigali (the capital city 
of Rwanda) following the plane crash. Reportedly, the Rwandese Prime Minister, 11 
UN peacekeepers and as many as 200,000 Rwandese were reported to be killed. [Ref. 
40) France, Belgium, and US took measures to evacuate their nationals. The Belgium 
batallion and other UN forces were withdrawn from the UN peacekeeping forces. Now 
only 270 UN peacekeepers are left in Rwanda, following the decision of the Security 
Council to maintain residual UN forces at a level of 270. In May 1994, pressures from 
the International community generated a decision from the Security Council to send 
an additional 5,500 UN personnel to Rwanda. 
D. FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS 
The Security Council originally authorized 2, 779 military personnel and ob-
servers, with 231 civilian personnel to be added to the mission for police monitoring, 
international civilian staffing and local personnel staffing. However, 2,500 UN peace-
keepers wer€ deployed in Rwanda until April 25, 1994, when the Security Council 
decided to retain only 270 residual UN forces in Rwanda. 
The cost of the observer teams of the Rwanda-Uganda mission was projected to be 
$4 million per year. However, this cost has escalated to $98 million with incorporation 
of the UN troops and the cooperation with the OAU /NMOG. 
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IX. ASSESSMENT OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN 
AFRICA 
A. WESTERN SAHARA 
The two disputing parties of the Western Sahara, the Fente Polisario and the 
Kingdom of Morocco, agreed to accept a cease-fire in May 1991. The cease-fire has 
held except for minor violations by both parties. Because of these minor skirmishes, 
the local consent factor (Fl) is given a medium rating. 
The UN has appeared to be neutral and impartial towards both factions, allowing 
factor (F2) to be rated High. 
In contrast, the UN sent limited manpower to support the Western Sahara effort 
with enough manpower. The limitation of troop support in turn lowered the manage-
ment and capability of information handling. The factor (F3) is thus assigned a Low 
rating. A main explanation for these ratings is that simultaneously the Security Coun-
cil and the US were forced to support Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion. This combined 
effort toward Kuwait pulled attention from the UN Peacekeeping operation in Western 
Sahara. This explanation is also valid for the low rating of factor F4 because the great 
powers could not devote time, energy and resources towards this effort. Finally, the 
UN goal of achieving a respected cease-fire and to hold a referendum remained clear, 
so factor F5 may be rated high. 
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TABLE 1: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR WESTERN SAHARA 
Local Consent M 
Neutrality and Impartiality H 
Capability of Handling Information L 
Support of the Great Powers L 
UN Goal Clarity H 
B. LmERIA 
Four major disputing parties exist in Liberia, the NPLF, the IGNU, the AFL, 
and ULIMO. Through ECOWAS mediation, these factions have signed and held the 
Cotonou Accords. The local consent in Liberia is therefore rated at least medium. The 
UN remained neutral and impartial toward all four factions. This factor is also rated 
High. 
The capability of handling information related to the external and internal envi-
ronment by the UN is also high as the UN stepped in following regional Peacekeeping 
Operations (ECOMOG) of three years. This period of time allowed greater access and 
analysis of information. This factor is rated High. 
The US power is also helping Liberia. At least $289 million in support has been 
spent on Liberian peacekeeping efforts, $29 million in support of regional peacekeeping 
and $260 million for humanitarian ajd. [Ref. 41) This factor is rated High. 
The UN goal in Liberia is very clear: to achieve cease-fire, to assist humanitarian 
tean1s and to hold general elections. This factor is rated High. 
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TABLE U: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR LmERIA 
Local Consent M 
Neutrality and Impartiality H 
Capability of Handling Information H 
Support of the Great Powers H 
UN Goal Clarity H 
C. ANGOLA 
Two disputing parties exist in Angola: the government and the rebel movement 
(UNITA). As Peace Accords exist f.:>r Angola, the local consent of the parties may 
be rated Medium. The neutrality and impartiality of the UN in Angola is strong, so 
this factor is rated High. In contrast, the capability of handling information related 
to the external and internal environment of UN forces was not strong. Otherwise, the 
UN could have been able to delay or stop the election process, knowing that t~e rebel 
leader would not accept a loss. Therefore, the rating of this factor is assigned as Low. 
Although the US and the Soviet Union have participated actively for the with-
drawal of Cuban forces from Angola, neither great power supported Angola and the 
US did not even recognize the existing government. This factor can be rated Low. 
The clarity of the UN goal did not change and was to maintain a respected 
cease-fire and to hold the elections. This factor is therefore rated high. 
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TABLE UI: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR ANGOLA 
Local Consent M 
Neutrality and Impartiality H 
Capability of Handling Information L 
Support of the Great Powers L 
UN Goal Clarity H 
D. SOMALIA 
The evaluation of the criteria for Somalia are rated in two steps, based on the 
evolution of UNOSOM. 
1. UNOSOM I 
The local consent of the disputing parties was very low following the Resolu-
tion 751(1992) creating UNOSOM. The Security Council was asked for continuation of 
negotiations between the disputing parties. An implicit recognition existed in the UN 
that no local consent had been reached, although the UN agreed to send 500 United 
Nations security personnel in August 1992. This factor may be rated Low. 
For UNOSOM I, the neutrality and impartiality of the UN was maintained, 
allowing this factor to be rated High. In contrast however, information was not handled 
well for the first phase of UNOSOM due to the lack of initial local consent and therefore, 
no local cooperation. 
At this time, no great power was giving support to Somalia. Evidence of 
this statement is that the UN member states were asked to contribute to this effort by 
the Security Council. Thus this factor is rated very Low. 
During this phase, the UN goal in Somalia was clear: to support humani-
tarian efforts. 
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TABLE IV: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR SOMALIA - UNOSOM I 
Local Consent L 
Neutrality and Impartiality H 
Capability of Handling Information L 
Support of the Great Powers L 
UN Goal Clarity H 
2. UNOSOM ll 
These ratings changed during UNOSOM II. After the decision of the Secu-
rity Council to send 37,000 troops to Somalia and following the US "Restore Hope" 
operation, the Somalian environment became safer and the humanitarian relief centers 
were able to feed the Somalis. However, the local consent of the fighting factions had 
still not been achieved. Thus, the local consent factor remained low. 
In contrast, the support of the great powers became high because the US 
sent 25,000 troops and Germany, France and Italy also sent troops to support the 
Somalian effort. 
The capability of handling information was still low because the local consent 
was still missing and there was no cooperation within the population. 
Two other factors dropped significantly. These factors were the neutrality 
and impartiality of the UN and the UN goal clarity. A main reason for the drop of 
these factors is due to the decision of the UN to arrest a faction leader (General Aidid). 
The UN goal therefore became unclear, allowing the UN to appear biased and partial. 
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TABLE V: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR SOMALIA - UNOSOM ll 
Local Consent L 
Neutrality and Impartiality L 
Capability of Handling Information L 
Support of the Great Powers H 
UN Goal Clarity L 
E. MOZAMBIQUE 
The two disputing parties signed an agreement of cease-fire on October 4, 1992. 
However, this agreement has never held. The local consent factor is rated medium to 
at least allow for the signing of the agreement. The UN is neutral and impartial in 
Mozambique, so this factor is rated High. 
In contrast, the capability of the UN to handle the information related to the 
external and internal environment is Low. A lengthy time passed before the appropriate 
level of UN forces could be determined as the UN could not figure out the number of 
troops of either the government or the rebel factions. 
Although some middle powers (France, United Kingdom, and Italy) participated 
in the elaboration and realization of the agreement signed in Rome, the UN Peace-
keeping effort in Mozambique was not supported outside the framework of the UN by 
any great power. The fact that these European countries, Germany, and the African 
Organization Unity became members of the supervisory and monitoring commission 
improves the support factor to a medium level. 
The UN goals in Mozambique were to hold elections, to support a humanitarian 
effort and to train and educate Mozambican soldiers for the new Mozambican Defence 
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Force. However, trying to a.ccomplish long term goals over a short period of time made 
the UN goals unrealistic. This factor is rated Low. 
TABLE VI: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR MOZAMBIQUE 
Local Consent M 
Neutrality and Impartiality H 
Capability of Handling Information L 
Support of the Great Powers M 
UN Goal Clarity L 
F. RWANDA-UGANDA 
Local consent was obtained through mediation of the OA U and the Tanzanian 
Republic. However, on April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda was killed in a plane 
crash. The plane crash allegedly occurred because of a rocket attack. The local consent 
factor, initially given a high rating, is now changed to low, due to the appearance that 
all factions are not respecting the formal agreement. Despite the mass killings in Kigali, 
w~.l!re 11 UN peacekeepers were killed, the UN has not retaliated and has remained 
neutral and impartial, allowing a high rating for this factor. 
The cooperation and collaboration between the OAU and the Tanzanian Republic 
allowed the UN to work with the rebels and the Rwandese government. However, the 
level of cooperation was not high enough to allow the UN to accurately evaluate the 
internal and external environment of Rwanda. Therefore, this factor is rated Low. 
Possibly the UN could have predicted the risk to the President with a different level of 
cooperation and communication. 
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Repatriation of nationals was organized by Kigali, France, Belgium and the US 
after the mass killings. This move is evidence that no great power was supporting the 
peace precess in Rwanda outside the framework of the UN security council. This factor 
is rated low. 
Two UN missions, UNOMUR and UNAMIR, exist in Rwanda-Uganda. The goals 
for these two missions are clear. The mission for UNOMUR is to monitor and prevent 
the transport of troops from Uganda to Rwanda. The mission for UNAMIR is to 
"contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive of the secure 
installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government." [Ref. 42] The 
UN clarity factor is therefore rated High. 
TABLE VII: PEACEKEEPING RATINGS FOR RWANDA-UGANDA 
Local Consent L 
Neutrality and Impartiality H 
Capability of Handling Information L 
Support of the Great Powers L 
UN Goal Clarity H 
G. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The assessment of the six UN operation-: ;n Africa is done through the mean of 
the rating scale as elaborated by Michael Brass;· · : · · the "Memory Jogger Plus" using 
seven management and planning tools. [Ref. 43. 
The five factors are rated low (1 point), medium (3 points}, and high (9 points). 
According to Brassard, these numerical values may be used to rank the factors. The 
scale used by Brassard is a tool which organizes information such as characteristics, 
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functions, and tasks into sets of items to compare. In comparing UN peacekeeping 
operations in Africa, the Brassard matrix diagram allows analysis of each country 
based on the principle that an intersection between the factors of success and the 
countries might indicate a relationship. 
The first questions asked is: Is there a relationship between the likelihood of 
success for a peackeeping operations in a given country with one particular factor of 
success? If the answer to this question is yes, the next step determine the strength of 
the relationship. The level of relationship will be high, medium, or low. 
• High = 9; there is a strong relationship or impact between UN policy (or decision 
or outcome) and a given factor with respect to the likelihood of success of a given 
UN operation. 
• Medium = 3; there is some relationship or impact between UN policy (or decision 
or outcome) and a given factor with respect to the likelihood of success of a given 
UN operation. 
• Low = 1; there is a weak (or none) relationship or impact between UN policy (or 
decision or outcome) and a give.1 factor with respect to the likelihood of a given 
UN operation. 
After multiplying these factors by the ratios, an analysis may be made of the ranking 




TABLE VIII: SUMMARY RATINGS FOR ALL COUNTRIES 
-- --
Country Fl F2 F3 F4 F5 Total H =9 Rank 
Local Neutrality External/ Great Goal M = 3 
Consent Impartiality Internal Power Clarity L=l 
Environment Support 
Liberia M H H II H 1M, 411 39 1st 
Rwanda-Uganda L H L L H 3L,2H 21 4th 
Angola M H L L H 1M, 2L, 2H 23 2nd 
Western Sahara M II L L H 1M, 2L, 211 23 2nd 
UNISOM I L H L L II 3L,2H 21 4th 
(Somalia) 
Mozambique M H L M L 2M, 2L, 111 17 6th 
UNISOM II L L L II L 4L, IH 13 7th 
(Somalia) 
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If we graph this information with the cumulative factor rates on the x-axis and 
the likelihood of success on they-axis, we see three groupings of countries: 
• Group 1: Liberia 
• Group 2: Angola and Western Sahara 
• Group 3: Somalia, Mozambique and Rwanda-Uganda 
From the calculations, Liberia may he considered as successful, Angola and West-
ern Sahara moderately successful, and Mozambique, Rwanda-Uganda and the com-
bined Somalian campaigns as only achieving a low rate of success. 
If the same ratios of 9, 3, and 1 are assigned to the factors (Fl-F5), the values 
are as follows in ranked order: 
• F2 = 55 (Neutrality and Impartiality) 
• F5 = 47 (UN Goal Clarity) 
• F4 = 25 (Support of the Great Powers) 
• Fl = 15 (Local Consent) 
• F3 = 15 (Capability of Handling Information) 
The ratings show that the UN remained impartial and neutral throughout all mis-
sions except UNISOM II. Also, the rating for goal clarity is high, with only Mozambique 
and UNISOM II having low goal clarity. These two factors have much higher values 
than the remaining three factors. 
The involvement of an optimal regional organization seems to be a determinant 
ingredient in successful peacekeeping operations. The presence of an optimal regional 
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organization also significantly increases the ratings of the factors related to the local 
consent (Fl ), and the information handling (F2). If the local population cooperates 
with the UN, UN peacekeepers are more informed about the internal and external 
environment, making peacekeeping implementation easier to achieve. For instance, 
many meetings were held for Liberia through ECOWAS involvement to assess the 
implementation of the Yamoussokro and Cotonou accords. The factions agreed to the 
disarmament and encampment process through these accords. 
In Rwanda-Uganda, regional OAU forces were present before the UN became 
involved, but these OAU forces were not as strong as ECOMOG forces to secure the 
Kigali Airport, at least not from preventing the shooting of the plane of the President. 
However, a large regional organization without a commitment of forces seems to 
be less effective, as OAU is in Rwanda. For instance, the UN operation in Western 
Sahara, although supported verbally by the OAU, does not have the benefit of com-
mitment of regional forces. Angola and Western Sahara are in a middle level in the 
chart, lacking the commitment of strong regional forces. These two countries lack great 
power support. 
At the lowest level are Somalia, Mozambique and Rwanda-Uganda. Somalia in 
UNISOM I had UN neutrality and impartiality as well as goal clarity. Following the 
changes in Somalia between UNISOM I and UNISOM II operations, these two values 
slipped from a high rating to a low rating. The great power support changed from low 
to high. Somalian peacekeeping efforts started out at a higher rating than Mozambique, 
but dropped with the increased involvement of the UN. At this time, Somalia lacks 
every factor except the support of the great powers (through March 1994 when US and 
main European forces withdrew). 
All five conditions necessary for a successful UN peacekeeping operation are now 
missing in Somalia. The large number of factions in Somalia (at least 15) make it 
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difficult to achieve a lasting "local consent." In addition, the UN issued a warrant 
to arrest one faction leader, allowing the UN to be perceived as being non-neutral 
(although that faction leader was suspected of involvement in the killing of Pakistani 
Peacekeepers in June 1993). This lack of neutrality on the part of the UN also lowered 
the rating of the internal and external environment. Moreover, the UN's ambitious 
agenda in Somalia changed the goal clarity from high to low. This overall rating is 
supported by the cumulative values in the table. 
Mozambique lacks two important factors: the level of accurate information avail-
able related to the external and internal environment and the UN goal clarity. Perhaps 
the goals described in the UN mandate for Mozambique are too ambitious for peace-
keeping. Matters such as education and training are long term goals difficult to realize 
within such a short period as defined by ONUMOZ mandate. 
Although the UN neutrality and impartiality factor is high, the local consent and 
the support of the great power factors are rated medium. The local consent is ranked 
as medium as ONUMOZ is one year behind schedule indicating that some aspects of 
the local consent need to be worked out. Although Italy and France helped to settle 
the agreements between the fighting parties, the United States is not supporting the 
UN mission in Mozambique outside the framework of the Security Council. This factor 
is rated medium. 
H. OVERALL FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL COSTS 
Although money is necessary for all UN peacekeeping operations, it is not the de-
terminant factor for conflict resolution in Africa. A look at UN personnel and financial 
costs support this premise. 
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TABLE IX: UN PERSONNEL 
Military Police and Civilian Total Rank 
Somalia 45,700 2,800 48,500 1st 
Mozambique 6,552 48 6,600 2nd 
Rwanda-Uganda 2,548 231 2,779 3rd 
Angola 350 458 808 4th 
Liberia 368 278 646 5th 
Western Sahara 324 103 427 6th 
Source: United Nations, Information Notes, Update #2, June 1993. 
Following the mass killings of April 1994, the UN Security Council decided to 
withdraw all but 270 UN troops from Rwanda. [Ref. 44] 
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TABLE X: COMPARISON OF UN FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES AND 
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
Budget (US$) Rank Likelihood of Success 
Scores Rank 
Somalia 977 million 1st 13 5th 
Mozambique 290 million 2nd 17 5th 
Angola 144 million 3rd 23 2nd 
Rwanda-Uganda 98 million 4th 21 4th 
Liberia 40 million 5th 39 1st 
Western Sahara 37 million 6th 23 2nd 
Source: United Nations, Information Notes, Update #2, June 1993. 
The data show that higher amounts of personnel and finances have been used 
to support Somalia and Mozambique than other countries. The highest amount of 
resources have thus gone to the two countries with the lowest likelihood of success, based 
on peacekeeping criteria developed in this thesis. Interestingly enough, the amount of 
personnel and financial resources expended toward the remaining four countries is 
equal or less than that for Mozambique alone. This result shows a definite contrast 
between the likelihood of success for peacekeeping as related to the support given for 
peacekeeping. 
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Six UN operations In Africa 
X. INTERVIEWS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
After developing the model for likelihood of success for UN peacekeeping in Africa, 
interviews at the UN headquarters were conducted to acquire additional information 
to supplement the research done in this thesis. The interviews were conducted with 
desk officers and military advisors of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, with the 
exception of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara officials were out of town and 
unavailable. The peacekeeping model was t · , · · • t.l'e interviewees and various 
questions were asked to obtain an assessment 01 "' · v .N view" towards the success of 
African peacekeeping. The interview process includes prewritten questions, personal 
interviews and individual rankings of peacekeeping operations in Africa. Interviews 
were conducted with the desk officers and military advisors at the UN headquarters 
from April10-14, 1994. Individual questions asked are listed in Appendix A. The list 
of interviewees is listed in Appendix B. 
A. LmERIA 
The interviewees rated all factors high for this UN operation. However, the inter-
viewees found Factor 1 to be the most important because it describes the willingness 
of the local people to be helped. The desk officers and military advisors feel that the 
likelihood of success might be affected if th;" rnnrlition is not met. 
When asked about the regional organi;;;:•: ·. ;:"':"lpact on the likelihood of UN suc-
cess, the interviewees thought that ECOMOG :. · . ,·~,1tful role in Liberia. However, 
they felt that the leading country in ECOMOG acts like a benevolent hegemonic power 
that seems to be willing to pull out of Liberia as soon as possible. 
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TABLE XI: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR LmERIA 
Fl Local Consent H 
F2 Neutrality and Impartiality H 
F3 Capability of Handling Information H 
F4 Support of the Great Powers H 
F5 UN Goal Clarity H 
B. RWANDA-UGANDA 
This UN operation is rated high for Factors ~ and 5, but low for Factors 1, 3, 
and 4. 
The interviewees would have viewed the ratings of Rwanda-Uganda high until 
April 6, 1994 when the President of Rwanda died in a plane crash. This incident 
is considered as evidence that the local consent was not high and the handling of 
information by the UN was also not high. Following the death of the President of 
Rwanda, mass killing occurred and as many as 200,000 Rwandese (Ref. 45] were 
reported to be killed. Also, France, Belgium and the US have evacuated their nations, 
giving additional evidence that the support of the great powers in Rwanda is not high. 




TABLE XD: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR 
RWANDA-UGANDA 
Fl Local Consent L 
F2 Neutrality and Impartiality H 
F3 Capability of Handling Information L 
F4 Support of the Great Powers L 
F5 UN Goal Clarity H 
C. ANGOLA 
The ratings of this UN operation by the desk officers and military advisors are: 
Low for Factors 1, 2, and 4. Indeed, the whole process of negotiating additional accords 
acceptable to the fighting factions is ongoing. The UN mission in Angola is rated high 
for Factors 2 and 5. However, the interviewees think that the UN mission should be 
enlarged once the rating of Factor 1 improves. 
TABLE XIII: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR ANGOLA 
Fl Local Consent L 
F2 Neutrality and Impartiality H 
F3 Capability of Handling Information L 
F4 Support of the Great Powers H 
F5 UN Goal Clarity H 
D. WESTERN SAHARA 
This information was not able to be obtained as the \Vestern Sahara officials were 
out of town. 
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E. SOMALIA (UNISOM I) 
The desk officers and the military advisors rated the first phase of UNISOM 
high for Factors 2 and 5, but they rated Factors 1, 3, and 4 low. They considered 
UNISOM I to be mainly a humanitarian operation after the successful US operation 
"Restore Hope." The officers felt that the UN did not have local consent, although 
many attempts were made to obtain local consent. 
TABLE XIV: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR SOMALIA 
(UNISOM I) 
F1 Local Consent L 
F2 Neutrality and Impartiality H 
F3 Capability of Handling Information L 
F4 Support of the Great Powers L 
F5 UN Goal Clarity H 
F. SOMALIA (UNISOM II) 
For this UN operation, the desk officers and military advisors rated all factors 
low. They think that "local consent" has never been obtained by the UN in Somalia, 
although this factor appears to be indispensable. UNISOl\1 II was carried out under 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which does not require the consent of the host country 
to carry out the UN mission of peace and security. 
All great powers pulled out from Somalia in March 1994, evidence of lack of 
support by the great powers. 
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Information gained from the interviews allows a conclusion to be made that the 
UN mission evolved under Chapter 7 because Somalia had no government and even 
now still has no government. The overall assessment and ratings are: 
TABLE XV: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR SOMALIA 
(UNISOM II) 
Fl Local Consent L 
F2 Neutrality and Impartiality L 
F3 Capability of Handling Information L 
F4 Support of the Great Powers L 
F5 UN Goal Clarity L 
G. MOZAMBIQUE 
The desk officers and military advisors feel that the UN mission in Mozambique is 
on track, even though a one year delay of the proposed timetable exists. Their ratings 
of Mozambique are: 
TABLE XVI: INTERVIEWEE'S SUMMARY RATINGS FOR 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Fl Local Consent H 
F2 Neutrality and Impartiality H 
F3 Capability of Handling Information M 
F4 Support of the Great Powers L 




The interviews of the UN desk officers and military advisors revealed two main 
factors, the most important factors in their view: 
• The political willingness of the people being helped by the UN (the local peo· 
pie), through the represented fighting parties. For the desk officers and military 
advisors, this local consent factor (Factor 1) is felt to be a prerequisite for UN 
involvement in Africa. The example used to show the importance of this is So-
malia, for which the factions did not want to cooperate until the UN designated 
an African special Envoy (Ambassador Kouyate from Guinea)1 This new special 
envoy was successful in obtaining a peace agreement signed by the two main 
factions in Somalia. 
• The second most important factor is the command and control factor responding 
to the questions: Who is in charge? Who is doing what? Who reports to whom? 
According to the interviewees, this issue is very important and goes beyond Factor 
3 ·the handling of information related to the internal and external environment. 
The UN does not have, and does not want to have, the intelligence network to 
monitor the influx and use of weapons and war equipment in these operations. 
A third issue discussed with the UN desk officers and military advisors is the 
role of regional organizations. Their answers reflected favorably toward regional orga-
nization by a majority of 2/3. Their rationale is that the regional organization has a 
least cost. The problem of command and control can be solved because the regional 
organization is more familiar with the internal environment. 
Unfavorable reasons for a regional organization are that the least cost argument 
may be an illusion. As the settlement of the conflict by a regional organization may take 
1 UN Special Envoy in Somalia after the departure of former UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe 
(Retired). 
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a longer time, there may be a higher cost in the long run. Also, Africa does not have a 
long-term military organization (like NATO - North American Treaty Organization). 
Member participants in NATO have training operations together with a standardized 
operative language (English). Another important reason is the UN policy to avoid 
involvement of neighboring countries. The UN does not want to impair its neutrality 
and impartiality when neighboring countries have a national interest in their neighbor's 
future. 
Although 1/3 of the desk officers and military advisors advanced the above rea-
sons for not believing in regional organization, the premise of this thesis and 2/3 of 
the desk officers and military advisors maintain that a regional organization is a de-
terminant ingredient for successful UN peacekeeping in Africa. Regional organization 
is the prerequisite frame with the ability to improve all factors necessary for success. 
From this information, Liberia is rated as the best UN peacekeeping operation with 
the highest likelihood of success. Much of this success in Liberia is due to the fruitful 
participation of ECOMOG under the auspices of ECOWAS. 
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TABLE XVII: SUMMARY RATINGS FOR ALL COUNTRIES 
II Coun,•y F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Total H =9 Rank Rank of the 
Local Neutrality External/ Great Goal M =3 Theoretical 
Consent Impartiality Internal Power Clarity L=1 Analysis 
Environment Support 
Liberia II H II H II 5H 45 lst 1st 
Rwanda-lJganda L II L L II 3L, 2H, 3L 21 4th 4th 
Angola L II L H II 2L, 3H 29 3rd 2nd 
Western Sahara N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2nd 
UNISOM I L II L L II 3L,211 21 4th 4th 
(Somalia) 
1 Mozambique H H .M L II 1M, IL, 3H 31 2nd 6th 
UNISOM II L L L H L 5L 5 5th 7th 
(Somalia) 








According to UN desk officer and military advisor interview information, the 
country grouping is: 
• Group 1: Liberia 
• Group 2: Angola and Mozambique 
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XI. CONCLUSIONS 
A comparison of the six UN on-going peacekeeping operations in Africa have been 
made through an analysis of five criteria determined to be necessary for peacekeeping. 
Four major criteria are borrowed from William J. Durch, who gave these criteria as 
being necessary for successful peacekeeping: [Ref. 45) 
1. The "local consent" of the fighting factions evaluated through the existence of for-
mal agreement( s) under the auspices of the organizations such as UN, ECOWAS, 
OAU, or even a military organization such as ECOMOG. 
2. The "neutrality and impartiality" of the organization sponsoring the peacekeep-
ing forces. The expectation for this sponsoring organization to be neutral and 
impartial is fundamental, allowing for credibility of the organizat_,~,. The organi-
zation is required to be able to talk to all factions without bias and discrimination 
and to be able to be recognized as neutral and impartial by all factions. 
3. The "capability of handling information": When the UN is sponsoring a peace-
keeping operation in Africa, the UN often commits many human and financial 
resources. The optimization of these resources requires that the UN can de-
rive appropriate information fron, ·xternal and internal environments regarding 
peacekeeping with that given country. For example, the UN should know: How 
many forces the factions have? How these factions obtain inside and outside 
support? The answers by the UN to these questions are necessary as they enable 
better decisions regarding a given operation in a country. 
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4. The "support of the great powers": During the Cold War, the support of the 
great powers was limited to the US and the Soviet Union. Because of the bipolar 
system, each superpower was able to persuade the countries within its zone of 
influence, e.g., each superpower could obtain desired actions from these countries. 
However, this situation is no longer valid. Therefore, the support of the great 
powers should be sought through countries which are permanent members of the 
Security Council. Active support is defined now as the support on a bilateral 
basis. 
5. These four criteria are supplemented by a fifth criteria: UN goal clarity. Is the 
mandate of UN peacekeeping in Africa generally clear and not subject to different 
interpretations? If the UN wants to accomplish many things within the period 
of peacekeeping, does the multiplicity of the goals make the situation unclear? 
The primary reaction is to ask questions such as: Are the goals clear and stable? 
Are the UN objectives understood? Do the UN goals shift with time? 
These five criteria should be assessed before, during, and after UN peacekeeping 
operations. This assessment will allow the UN to redirect its efforts if necessary or to 
act appropriately. How should these criteria be assessed? A suggested method is to 
assess the five criteria through a rating scale of Low, Medium, and High ratings. 
• Low: No requirements are met. 
• Medium: Acceptable conditions exist but some important conditions are missing. 
• High: All conditions are met. 
After assessing these criteria, a ranking of the UN operations is obtained. This ranking 
may be used to determine whether UN operations should be started or continued. 
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The assessment from my research before the UN interviews yielded the following 
findings for the countries studied. Three groupings of countries with respect to UN 
operations emerged with different levels of likelihood of success. 
• Group 1: Liberia, with a high level of likelihood of success. 
• Group 2: Western Sahara and Angola with a medium likelihood of success. 
• Group 3: Rwanda-Uganda, Somalia, and Mozambique with a low level of likeli-
hood of success. 
The UN is providing high amounts of human and financial resources for these six 
peacekeeping operations. The UN should take into consideration the level of likelihood 
of success. The UN should consider shifting resources from the countries with low 
likelihood of success to countries with high levels of likelihood of success. In particular, 
Group 3 countries should be left to a strict level of humanitarian type of UN operation 
until the fundamental factors of success are met. 
The UN interviews provided both similar and divergent findings. 
1. Common Points: 
The thesis research and the UN interviews agree that Liberia has the highest 
peacekeeping rating and Somalia (both UNOSO.M I and UNOSO.M II) and Rwanda-
Uganda have the poorest ratings. 
2. Divergent Points: 
A main divergent point brought out by the interviews with the UN desk of-
ficers and military advisors is that the UN mission in Mozambique is rated higher. The 
interviews portrayed Mozambique in an optimistic view because no major violations 
exist. They felt that the peacekeeping program is on track and doing fairly well. 
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This thesis research pointed out that the UN mission in Mozambique has 
already experienced a one year delay. This delay shows that the "local consent" factor 
is not at a sufficient level for peacekeeping. Moreover, the UN mission in Mozam-
bique has also experienced a high cost in human and financial resources. Therefore, 
the international community might not want to pledge additional resources towards 
Mozambique without an acceptable level of "local consent." Due to these factors, the 
ranking given by the UN desk officers and military advisors seems to be too optimistic. 
The overall conclusion is that: the UN operation in Liberia has a high like-
lihood of success and deserves more help from the UN. The internationals community 
will probably be willing to give support through organizations such as ECOWAS and 
ECOMOG. The UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda-Uganda have a poor likeli-
hood of success. The start of these operations, as related to the peacekeeping criteria 
listed here, are now seen as false starts because the basic requirements were not met. 
Therefore, UN actions in these countries should now be restricted to a level of human-
itarian actions until the concerned countries find the necessary strength to fulfill the 
fundamental conditions of minimum likelihood of success. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The peacekeeping operations were ranked from the criteria developed in Chapter 
II. The Liberian mission seems to have a high likelihood of success. However, continual 
reassessments of updates of the agreements between the fighting factions under the 
auspices of ECOWAS should be performed. The Yamoussokro and Cotonou accord., 
should be implemented by ECOWAS. The human and financial resources spent toward 
the UN mission in Liberia seem to be reasonable. 
The UN peacekeeping efforts in Angola and \Vestern Sahara were rated as having 
less likelihood of success unless the factors for success improve. These two operations 
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do not appear likely to achieve the outcomes stated by the UN Security Council. These 
low likelihoods of success are due mainly to lack of "local consent" expressed in terms of 
political willingness, an insufficient handling of the information related to the external 
and internal environments, and a lack of support of the great powers. 
The UN operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Mozambique should be reassessed. 
These three operations lack local consent and good handling of information related 
to the internal and external environments. Moreover, the UN goals for Somalia and 
Mozambique are unclear and perhaps too ambitious. The human and financial re-
sources used toward Rwanda, Somalia and Mozambique should be readjusted until 
peacekeeping criteria are met. The people of these countries must demonstrate a com-
mitment to develop local consent. Local consent is one among five peacekeeping criteria 
that is indispensable to obtain continued commitment of the international community. 
In the meantime, these three UN operations should be adjusted to a level of humani-
tarian operation. 
The resources should be utilized toward more successful peacekeeping operations, 
e.g., Liberia or Western Sahara or Angola. The international community will continue 
to support Africa only is the African people show commitment to viable and sizable 
regional organizations, helping to promote peace and seniority in the continent. A 
political willingness to solve African violence could be magnified with this type of 
commitment by the people. 
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APPENDIX A 
UNITED NATIONS INTERVIEW PROCEDURES 
A. PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW 
Two main purposes exist for the interviews of United Nations desk officers and 
military advisors. These are: 
• To identify current human and financial resources for United Nations peacekeep-
ing in Africa. 
• To make recommendations for the optimization of United Nations resources in 
African peacekeeping operations. 
The answers to these questions will assist in the ranking process for the six current 
UN operations in Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda-
Uganda, and Somalia). This data will be combined with peacekeeping criteria to rank 
the overall likelihood for success for each mission. 
B. DEFINITIONS OF THE FIVE FACTORS OF LIKELIHOOD OF SUC-
CESS FOR UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA 
The definitions of successful criteria as well as the rating scale were explained to 
the desk officers and military advisors prior to the interviews. The criteria are: 
• The "local consent" of the disputing parties: the existence of a formal (or many 
agreements) through the sponsorhsip of an impartial organization, e.g., UN, 
OAU, ECOWAS. This function is named Fl. 
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• The "neutrality and impartiality" of the organization which has sponsored the 
peacekeeping forces: the sponsoring organization should be neutral and impartial. 
This function is named F2. 
• The "capability of handling information" related to the external and internal 
environments of the peacekeeping forces. Does the UN know the number of 
troops each faction has? Does the UN know how ammunition and equipment 
are being supplied? Does the UN know what external forces are helping each 
faction or that could impede the progress of the UN peacekeeping mandate? 
This function is named F3. 
• The "active support of the great powers" e.g., the United Nations, the Soviet 
Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this criterion will either be 
linked to the five permanent members of the Security Council or to the only 
superpower left, the United States. "Active support" is defined as support from 
the superpower that is separate from the involvement of that power within the 
UN, e.g., United States is helping Liberia on a bilateral basis (both within and 
outside the auspices of the UN), or the US is helping Somalia on a bilateral basis 
with respect to the settlement of a particularly difficult situation (civil war, fights 
between government and rebels). This function is named F4. 
• The "UN goal clarity" or the UN objectives in a particular country of the peace-
keeping operation. Are the goals clear and stable? Are the UN objectives under-
stood by the fighting parties? Do the UN goals shift with time? This function is 
named F5. 
80 
¥- ·* z .... Q(.J 4 ·- it 4 il .7 L!!.. p; ),.$ 9 ;;. .4.41. 
C. THE UN RATING SCALE 
The UN peacekeeping operations in Africa might be assessed by measurement of 
the criteria of likelihood of success. The measurement may be set on a scale from low 
to high for each criterion. The scale below is used to evaluate the five peacekeeping 
operations. These five criteria are assumed to be with equal importance with respect 
to each operation. This assumption is made to allow the analysis to be as accurate as 
possible. 
• High: All requirements are met. For instance, a written agreement exists between 
the fighting parties, or an organization assesses and promotes complementary or 
additional agreements, or an organization enforces the implementation of the 
agreements or accords. 
• Medium: The conditions are acceptable, but not all conditions are met. For 
example, a signed agreement may exist but has not been respected by all factions, 
or the timetable for disarmament may not have been respected; or a regional 
organization is not in place to assess the implementation of the agreement or to 
promote additional or complementary agreements or accords. 
• Low: Minimum requirements are not met. For instance, an incomplete formal 
agreement may exist, but no faction is respecting these agreements or accords. 
D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Each interviewee was asked the same questions, listed below, and asked to eval-
uate the five peacekeeping criteria as they relate to the six UN peackeeping operations 
in Africa. The evaluation form follows the questions. 
81 
eq 
1. Question 1 
Would you please relate the background of each UN peacekeeping operation 
(Western Sahara, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda-Uganda, and Somalia) from 
your perspective? Please include political details that you are aware of. If a regional 
organization is involved, please describe how it was set up. 
2. Question 2 
How would you rate the five following factors (criteria) with respect to the 
UN operations undertaken in Africa? 
3. Question 3 
Why did the OAU and ECOWAS get involved in Mozambique, Western 
Sahara, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda-Uganda, and Angola? 
4. Question 4 
How do you view the ECOWAS involvement in Liberia? 
5. Question 5 
What does regional organization do for UN peacekeeping in Africa? 
6. Question 6 
Do you feel that the involvement of a regional organization is important in 
• 
settling conflicts between fighting factions? How much would the establishment of a 
regional organization be able to contribute toward the achievement of a successful UN 
peacekeeping operation in Africa? 
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E. EVALUATION OF THE CRITERIA 
Western Sahara 
Fl LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F2 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F3 LO\V MEDIUM HIGH 
F4 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F5 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Liberia 
Fl LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F2 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F3 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F4 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F5 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Angola 
Fl LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F2 LO\V MEDIUM HIGH 
F3 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F4 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F5 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
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Rwanda-Uganda 
Fl LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F2 LO\V MEDIUM HIGH 
F3 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F4 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F5 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Mozambique 
Fl LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F2 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F3 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F4 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F5 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Somalia 
Fl LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F2 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F3 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F4 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
F5 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED NATIONS INTERVIEWEES 
The list of United Nations desk officers and military advisors interviewed at the 
United Nations headquarters in New York from Aprilll-15, 1994 is below. 
A. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
• Major J. Napoli (US), Assistant of the Head of the Planning Division 
B. ANGOLA 
• Mr. Dimitri Titov (Russia), Political Advisor 
• Brigadier General Saksena (India), Military Advisor 
• LTC Mulkowski (Poland), Desk Advisor 
C. LmERIA 
• Margaret Carey (US), Military Advisor 
• Captain E. Washington (Zimbabwe), Desk Officer 
D. MOZAMBIQUE 
• Dimitri Titov (Russia), Political Advisor 
• LTC Martin (Argentina), Military Advisor 
• Mo.,jor Singh (India), Desk Officer 
E. RWANDA-UGANDA 
• LTC Martin (Argentina), Military Advisor 
• Captain E. \Vashington (Zimbabwe), Desk Officer 
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F. SOMALIA 
• Colonel Couton (France), Military Advisor 
G. WESTERN SAHARA 





UN United Nations 
US United States of America 
ECOWAS Economic Community of Western African States 
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
FENTE POLISARIO Fente Popular Para La Liberacion de Saguia 
el-Hamrade de Orio de Oro 
SADR Sahara Arab Democratic Pepublic 
MINURSO United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara 
SAHRAWIS People of Western Sahara 
IGNU Interim Government of National Unity in Liberia 
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
ULIMO United Liberation Movement for Democracy 
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SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General 
UNOMIL United Nations Observers Mission in Liberia 
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
RENAMO Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 
NEC National Electoral Council 
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
LAS League of Arab States 
OIC Organization of Islamic Community 
UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia 
UNITAF United Task Force 
RPF Rwandese Patriotic Front 
UNOMUR United Nations Observers Mission in Rwanda 
UNAMIR United Nations Observers Mission in Rwanda 
UNITA Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola 
(National Union for the total : rl .... pendence of Angola) 




1. Africa Watch, A Division of Human Rights Watch, Volume 5, Issue #6, Wash-
ington DC, June 1993. 
2. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Hearing before the Senate For-
eign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, regarding US Foreign Policy 
regarding Liberia, Togo, and Zaire, June 9, 1993. 
3. Basri, Driss, Le Maroc de Hassan II, Edification d'un Etat Moderne, Albin 
Mit:-tel, Paris. 
4. Bernet, Louis Le Roy, International Organizations - Principles and Issues, Fifth 
Edition, Prentice-Hall. 
5. Bloomfield, Treventon, Alternatives to Intervention, Rienner Publishers, Inc .. 
Boulder, Colorado. 
6. Brezezinski, Out of Control, Charles Saibner's Sons, MacMilllan Publishing 
Company, New York. 
7. Bryson, John M., Stmtegic Planning for Public and Non-Profit Organizations, 
Jossey-Bass Inc., San Francisco, California. 
8. Crossette, Barbara, "Peacekeeping Mission is Sanitized- United Nations Peace-
keeping Forces in Western Sahara," New York Times, March 1, 1992. 
9. Guy, Dan M., Alderman, \Vayne, Winter, Alan J., Auditing, Third Edition, The 
Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace, New York. 
10. Durch, William, Building in Sand - UN Peacekeeping in Western Sahara. In-
ternational Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993. 
11. Economist, Making No Peace- United Nations Peacekeeping Efforts, Vol. 329. 
p. 45(2), October 12, 1993. 
12. Eskew, Robert and Jensen, Daniel L., Financial Accounting, Fourth Edition, 
MacGraw Hill, Inc., New York. 
13. Gabarro, John J., Afanaging People and Organizations - The Practice of Man-
agement Series, Harvard Business School Publications, Boston, Massachusetts. 
14. Henderson, David, The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics, Warner Books. 
15. Hoots, Charles, Western Sahara: Old Conflict, New Rules, Public Affairs Infor-
mation Service, 1993. 
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16. Hunt, V. Daniel, Quality Management for Government, Quality Press, Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin. 
17. Lewis, Paul, "UN Plan for Saharan Voting Gains Support," New York Times, 
January 1, 1992. 
18. Mintzberg, Henry and Quinn, James Brian, The Strategy Process - Concepts 
and Contexts, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
19. Neuman, Robert E., The Frailty of New Democracies: Assisting New Nations, 
Information Access Co., 1994. 
20. Urquhart, Brian, A Life in Peace and War, Norton. 
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